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Employment-At-Will and Contract
Principles: The Paradigm of Pennsylvania
Howard C. Ellis*
I. Introduction
Emeco Industries is a manufacturer of office furniture located in
Hanover, Pennsylvania. In 1984 the president of Emeco orally of-
fered to one William Scullion the position of vice-president of sales
and marketing.1 At that time Scullion, age fifty-one, was living and
working in California. Emeco's president told him that this would be
the "last job he would ever have." 2 His compensation was to have
included generous retirement benefits.3 In order to accept the posi-
tion at Emeco, Scullion turned down a salary increase from his then
current employer, sold his house, and moved to Hanover. Undoubt-
edly expecting to establish a permanent home there, he bought a
building lot. Fifteen weeks after he started working, Scullion was
discharged ."
Stories like Scullion's are becoming commonplace. An increas-
ingly wider spectrum of employees, from experienced executives like
Scullion to newly minted M.B.A.'s, are caught by surprise when they
suddenly find themselves without a job, soon after having made sub-
stantial life-changes for the sake of a new or present employer. An
employee may be intellectually aware that accepting a new job or a
transfer potentially entails such adjustments and risks. Yet it is nev-
ertheless an emotional and financial shock to be suddenly cast adrift
from the new position.
The employer who provokes an employee's reliance, who seems
to be "as good as his word," might turn around, as Emeco did, and
discharge the employee without cause. Even a firm believer in free-
dom of contract might be offended by such an employer's insensitiv-
ity to the expectations and life-changes that it may purposefully have
* Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Millersville University of Pennsylva-
nia; J.D. 1977, Vanderbilt University School of Law; M.B.A. 1979, Owen Graduate School of
Business, Vanderbilt University; B.A. 1972, University of Pennsylvania.
I. Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 580 A.2d 1356, 1357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allo-
catur denied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1991).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1358.
4. Id.
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induced. The question arises: Should the law impose any duties on
the parties to such an employment relation beyond the explicit con-
tract that the parties have been able to fashion themselves?
It may have been beyond the employee's bargaining power to
extract from the employer a promise of employment of a definite
term in exchange for suffering these kinds of dislocation. It may not
have occurred to the employee that an express promise would be nec-
essary. One simply does not expect to be terminated without cause
shortly after accepting a new job or a transfer to a. distant city. The
corporate ethos often precludes the management employee from
dealing with the company at arm's length. The relationship they
hope to forge is one of mutual trust. By asking for a definite term of
employment, the employee may seem to be doubting the company's
good faith.
In the absence of a contract for a definite duration, employees
fall under the reach of what has been the dominant doctrine of em-
ployment law in Pennsylvania and throughout the United States for
more than a century: employment-at-will. The essential values un-
dergirding employment-at-will are: 1) the freedom of the employer
to carry on his or her business, and 2) the freedom of both parties
(employer and employee) to contract. The first value is rooted in effi-
ciency concerns. Employment contracts whose binding nature is le-
gally imposed rather than expressly bargained for may hinder a busi-
ness in its ability to react to changing economic conditions through
lay-offs and terminations that might not be supported by just cause
in the legal sense,5 but are an efficient method of controlling costs.
Freedom of contract also promotes efficiency by allowing parties to
5. Most courts generally allow termination at-will, while a few require just cause. There
could be, however, a middle course. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws define "Good cause" as:
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination of the
employee's employment in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which
may include the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct on the job or other-
wise, job performance, and employment record, or
(ii) the exercise of business judgment in good faith by the employer, including
setting its economic or institutional goals and determining the size of its work
force."
The concept embedded in section (i) is similar to the common law concept of "just cause."
However, section (ii) broadens that concept considerably, as it allows good cause for termina-
tion to rest solely on the employer's needs and good faith business judgment and is indepen-
dent of the employee's performance on the job. Thus, a requirement of "good cause" as therein
defined for employment termination would allow for much more freedom of management ac-
tion than the "just cause" standard so often debated by our courts. NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL EM-
PLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT 9-10 (1991) [hereinafter MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
ACT].
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maximize their own preferences through private exchange. As signif-
icant as efficiency is the notion, fundamental in a capitalistic eco-
nomic system, that freedom is important for its own sake. In the
absence of fraud or duress, the free marketeer would argue that the
parties should be held to whatever bargain they are able to make for
themselves and that they should submit to the adjustments which the
market forces on them. According to this principle, the law should
not be interested in disturbing existing imbalances of bargaining
power. There is nothing intrinsically unfair in the fact that one party
to a transaction has more economic power than another.'
Very few states view the employees who are treated like Mr.
Scullion as victims of abuse of employer power. They have reacted
strongly to the potential for victimization by requiring good faith or
just cause in all discharges,7 in effect abrogating the employment-at-
will doctrine. However, in many states, including Pennsylvania, the
courts seem reluctant to so severely restrict employer conduct. These
courts adhere to traditional employment-at-will principles for the
most part, while recognizing the need to mitigate the stringency of
that doctrine.8 While tort theories of wrongful discharge, such as
those based on malice or violation of public policy, can sometimes be
valuable weapons in the employee arsenal, they are unavailable in
many cases in which employees have been victimized and in which
justice requires some remedy. 9 Though a discharge may not be mali-
6. Frederich A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, reprinted in
THOMAS DONALDSON & PATRICIA H. WERHANE, ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS 278 (3d ed.
1988).
7. Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law:
The Employment At Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 246 (1984).
8. It has been estimated that as many as 40-45 states now recognize at least one of the
theories modifying the doctrine of employment-at-will. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINA-
TION ACT, supra note 5, prefatory note, at 3.
9. The Pennsylvania courts have recently served notice that the "public policy" excep-
tion to at-will employment is quite limited, and the "specific intent to harm" exception may no
longer exist. See Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). These cases cite
Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990) and Clay v. Advanced Computer Applica-
tions, 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989), as indicative of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's antipathy
to the use of tort theories to find a termination to be wrongful when the employment is at-will.
Yetter, 585 A.2d at 1025; Hershberger, 575 A.2d at 946-47. In a concurrence in Clay, the
Chief Justice offered his opinion that no action exists for wrongful discharge for any reason.
Clay, 559 A.2d at 922 (Nix, C.J., concurring). The other justices, however, seem to be willing
to recognize the continued vitality of the public policy exception to employment-at-will, and at
least two justices would have extended that exception to gender discrimination based on the
Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment. PA. CONST. art. I § 28. The federal courts, interpret-
ing Pennsylvania law in diversity cases, have also joined in abdicating the malicious discharge
theory. See Asko v. Bartle, 762 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Redick v. Kraft, 745 F.
Supp. 296, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (employee fired immediately upon giving notice he was
quitting).
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cious10 in the tort sense and may offend no recognized public pol-
icy," it still may have a devastating negative impact on the em-
ployee which is not offset by compelling efficiency gains to the
employer.
In most spheres of commerce, freedom to contract is not abso-
lute. Contract principles exist to prevent the victimization of those
who are in a position to be overreached. 2 Yet many ordinary com-
mon law contract principles have long been excluded from the em-
ployment relation. "[T]here is one area of contract law which is
strikingly idiosyncratic. That is the law of employment contracts. It
has developed contrary to all of the standard modern contract princi-
ples . , "13
It will be argued herein that these same principles which are
generally accepted in other areas of the law" should be invoked to
,protect those who enter into at-will employment contracts. These are
principles designed to protect individuals who enter into contracts
from the hardships caused by unkept promises, justifiable reliance,
and overreaching. It is difficult to see why employees are not as de-
serving of protection as purchasers and sellers of goods, providers
and consumers of services, and, of course, employers. New contract
doctrines are not necessary to protect the employee. Existing doc-
trines are adequate. It is necessary merely to apply these doctrines to
the employment relation. Though the arguments long cited by the
courts to distinguish employment law from other contracts may still
be meaningful in some contexts, it is argued here that there are some
10. "A wrongful act ...done willfully or purposely to injure another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 958 (6th ed. 1990). Pennsylvania courts favor the phrase "specific intent to
harm."
I1. Pennsylvania courts appear to have limited the public policy exception only to a
"violation of a clearly mandated public policy which strikes at the heart of a citizen's social
right, duties, and responsibilities. ... Hershberger, 575 A.2d at 948-49 (citation omitted).
The only recognized public policy exceptions were set forth in: Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (discharging an employee for making a statutorily re-
quired report); Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980) (discharging an employee upon discovering a criminal conviction for which the employee
had received a pardon); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
(discharging an employee for serving on jury duty).
In a recent case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court broadened the public policy exception.
In Macken v. Lord Corp., 585 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), the court recognized a cause
of action for discharge in retaliation for the filing of a worker's conpensation claim.
12. Some principles are fraud, misrepresentation, disclosure of latent defects, mistake,
duress, undue influence, lack of capacity, and illegality.
13. Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur
denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987).
14. For example, the contract principles discussed infra are applicable to sales of goods
under the Uniform Commercial Code, to sales of services by independent contractors, and to
real estate transactions.
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cases, at least, in which efficiency and justice are better served by
providing parties to employment contracts with the same protections
given parties to contracts in other spheres of commerce. One of these
special situations is the case of the recently hired or transferred em-
ployee who undergoes significant disruption and expense in order to
take a new position.
After presenting a brief survey of the development of English
and American employment theory, a description of emerging em-
ployment doctrine will follow, using Pennsylvania law as a represen-
tative example of the doctrine prevailing in the United States today.
Subsequently, the special case of the recently hired or transferred
employee who is terminated after a relatively short time will be ex-
amined. The argument will be made that the employment-at-will
presumption should not be treated as if it were conclusive, but rather
that it should be rebuttable by evidence of additional consideration,
implied promises, reliance, or overreaching. Such a view would be
consistent with traditional doctrine in other areas of contract law
and would help to provide employees with security both necessary
and legitimate, without sacrifice to the legitimate contractual rights
of employers.
II. Competing Presumptions: Historical Analysis
A. The English Experience
For centuries, if a contract of employment was of indefinite du-
ration, English law presumed a term of employment of one year."
Although the presumption was intended to provide greater security
to employees, as applied by the English courts this presumption
mostly benefitted the employer. The employee who quit before the
year ended suffered possible imprisonment and forfeiture of the
wages earned for the portion of the year he or she had worked."0
Moreover, the courts were quick to side with an employer seeking
termination, allowing liberal grounds for dismissal.17 Regardless of
which party sought the termination, the employee suffered forfeiture
of wages. 8
15. SANFORD M. JACOBY. COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW 85, 90 (1982); Greene, 526 A.2d
at 1196; Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Prior to the
one year rule there existed a statute, later repealed, requiring just cause for discharge. Dar-
lington, 504 A.2d at 309 (citing Statute of Labourers, 5 ELIZ. ch. 4 (1562)).
16. Lary S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption That Employment
Is Terminable At Will, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 219, 227 (1986-87).
17. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 85-128.
18. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 96.
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In the last century the one-year presumption in England has
given way to a statutory requirement of reasonable notice and statu-
tory procedures to remedy an unfair dismissal.19 Longer notice is
generally required for white collar than for blue collar employees,
sometimes as much as a year's notice for managers.2" It has been
suggested that rigid class distinctions are the explanation for the de-
velopment of the modern English rule. 1
B. The American Experience
Before the mid-nineteenth century, American courts generally
followed the English one-year rule.22 By 1877, however, most Ameri-
can courts had moved away from the annual presumption. Some
courts adopted the so called "rate-of-pay rule," finding the existence
of a weekly, monthly, or even annual contract based on the salary
period agreed to by the parties. 4 Other courts were willing to hold
that under the facts of the case before them, an intention of at-will
employment could be discerned.2 5
Freedom of contract has always been the nominal, and often the
actual, doctrinal underpinning of the development of employment
law in the United States.26 The annual presumption and reasonable
notice requirement developed by the English stood in direct contrast
to the American notion that the parties are entitled to no more than
the contractual terms they have intended. 7 In the early American
cases, there was seldom an automatic application of any presump-
tion. Rather, the courts were engaged in ascertaining and fulfilling
the implicit intentions of the parties2 In some cases, that intention
was found to be employment-at-will, and in others, to be employ-
19. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 127.
20. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 101.
21. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 119-20.
22. David P. Weiss, Note, Public Policy Limitations to the Employment At Will Doc-
trine Since Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 44 U. PITT. L REV. 1115, 1117 (1983).
23. Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426 (1864). Following Thirteenth Amendment doctrine,
"[it] is well settled that the employee can quit at any time, when the job becomes intolerable
or undesirable." Larson, supra note 16, at 226.
24. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 108.
25. See, e.g., Coffin, 46 Pa. 426; Peacock v. Cummings, 46 Pa. 434 (1864).
26. See, e.g., Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
("The right of competent adults to contract is the lifeblood of our free enterprise system.
Voluntary agreements are the foundation of our society's freedom and prosperity."), allocatur
denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987).
27. "[lt is the intention of the parties which is the ultimate guide, and in order to
ascertain that intention, the court may take into consideration the surrounding circumstances,
the situation of the parties, the objects they apparently have in view, and the nature of the
subject matter of the agreement." Price v. Confair, 79 A.2d 224, 226 (Pa. 1951).
28. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 108.
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ment of a more lasting kind.
The publication in 1877 of Horace Wood's treatise2 9 on employ-
ment law provided an authority for courts to rely on when deciding
subsequent cases."a He captured what was probably the trend in the
United States at that time:
With us [American Courts] the rule is inflexible, that a general.
or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the
servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon
him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring,
and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only
at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve."1
Though the pre-1877 cases may not have clearly supported such
a bold assertion, the formal stating of it in a treatise lent legitimacy
to those courts that favored the employment-at-will presumption
over other doctrines.3 2 The presumption was also in accord with the
prevailing economic theory of the early 1900s that society's wealth
would be maximized by allowing business people complete freedom
in hiring and firing . 3  a
Though freedom of contract was originally cited as its basis,3"
the employment-at-will presumption became more rigid as courts
soon began to glorify, not freedom of contract, but the freedom of
employers to manage their businesses as they wished.3 5 It became a
29. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (Albany
1877).
30. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 113. Wood was first cited in Pennsylvania in 1893. Phila-
delphia Packing & Provision Cos. Estate, 4 Pa. 57 (1893).
31. WooD, supra note 29, at 272. ("The American termination-at-will rule is more cor-
rectly stated by saying that absent an express agreement to the contrary, employment is of
indefinite duration and may be terminated at will."); Larson, supra note 16, at 221.
32. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 116.
33. Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur
denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987).
34. Id.
35. Id; see JACOBY, supra note 15, at 114. By limiting the employee's cause of action,
"the courts have protected the employer's interest in making valid and justified business deci-
sions." Weiss, supra note 21, at 1133. The case law in Pennsylvania also protects invalid and
unjustified business decisions. See, e.g., Banas v. Matthews, 502 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985). Banas was discharged for using his employer's supplies and equipment to make a grave
marker. Id. at 640. Though the jury agreed that Banas had been given permission to make the
grave marker, the court held:
But that fact is irrelevant. Appellant's handbook nowhere provided that an em-
ployee would be dismissed only if the facts warranted it . . . . Whether appel-
lant's belief [that no permission was given] was correct, - i.e., in accordance
with the fact - has nothing to do with the case . . . . [That is] the essence of
appellee's status as an employee-at-will, who may be dismissed "for any or no
reason.
Id. at 647-48 (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974); see
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matter of public policy that the employer was the master of his busi-
ness. 3  It was soon forgotten that Wood had framed the rule as one
creating only a prima facie hiring at will, 37 with the party who chal-
lenged the employment-at-will presumption having to prove the pre-
sumption did not apply.3 8 Rather, early in this cenlury, courts began
to treat the presumption as conclusive, regardless of the intent of the
parties and without concern for the abuse of employees engendered
by this blind adherence to the at-will rule.39
In recent years, however, the courts have begun to retrace their
steps, returning to the earlier view of employment-at-will as a rebut-
table presumption.4" Believing that in the majority of cases the par-
ties do, in fact, intend their contracts to be terminable at-will, courts
find the presumption to serve two purposes. It is procedurally expedi-
ent, dispensing with the need to prove what can be presumed in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, and it guards against the
prejudice of juries, which are likely to be composed mostly of em-
ployees..4 But because "it is a terrible distortion of priorities to ele-
vate concerns of efficiency over those of equity" '42 and "equity de-
mands that the parties to a contract receive that which they intended
to exchange, ' 3 it is important for the courts to remember not to
also Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990).
36. Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 320 (Pa. Saper. Ct. 1986).
37. Wood, supra note 29, at 272.
38. Wood, supra note 29, at 272; see Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1197
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987); Edwards v. Delhi, 169
S.E. 907, 908 (Va. 1933).
39. Greene, 526 A.2d at 1197; see WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY AND MICHAEL J. LEECH,
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 252 (1985); PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMIS-
SAL LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (1984). The employment-at-will presumption was arguably raised
temporarily to the level of a constitutional doctrine by the invalidation of federal and state
laws protecting employees from discharge for being union members. See Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). But see Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974) ("The notion that substantive due process ele-
vates an employer's privilege of hiring and discharging his employees to an absolute constitu-
tional right has long since been discredited."). See the text at note 74. The cases from Henry
in 1891 until Geary in 1974 did not treat the presumption as conclusive, but allowed evidence
to rebut it. In almost every case the court addressed the issue of whether any contrary intent
could be gleaned from the circumstances.
40. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974) (rebut-
ting presumption with tort claim of malice or violation of public policy); Marsh v. Boyle, 530
A.2d 491, 494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 314 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986).
41. Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur
denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (1987). One wonders if the court in Greene believes as strongly that it





allow the presumption to foreclose proof of contrary intentions.
While judicial acceptance of employment-at-will was growing in
the early twentieth century, the rate-of-pay rule was losing ground.
It was explicitly rejected by Wood,45 but was not rejected immedi-
ately by all of the courts.4 16 By 1917, however, the " 'drift of modern
judicial thought' was in the direction of favoring the at-will doctrine
over the rate-of-pay rule."4 7 Today, rate-of-pay is not properly a rule
in the majority of states, 8 but is rather a factor to be considered in
ascertaining the intent of the parties.
Although parties to employment contracts often intend at-will
terminability, 9 in some cases the circumstances reasonably lead to
the inference that long-term or even permanent employment is in-
tended. 50 Therefore, discharge would only be rightful when just
cause exists. When nothing is said by the parties regarding the dura-
tion of the employment relation they are forming, and the circum-
stances shed no light on their intentions, how long does the "reasona-
ble employee" expect to keep his job? Is it not reasonable for him to
believe that so long as there is enough work for him to do and he
performs his job in a satisfactory manner, that his employment will
44. Id. Clear evidence that the parties intended a contrary result is a sufficient safeguard
against prejudicial jury verdicts. See also Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174,
179 (1974). -[Considerations of case load and proof problems] do not . . . justify denying a
legal forum to a plaintiff with a justiciable claim." Id. Sometimes offered as a rationale for
viewing even express promises of long-term employment as creating employment-at-will is the
absence of mutuality of obligation. See infra text accompanying note 104.
45. Wood, supra note 29, at 272; see supra text accompanying note 25.
46. "The rate-of-payment rule continued to be accepted by the courts in a majority of
the states, even as late as 1942." JACOBY, supra note 15, at 114. But see Larson, supra note
16, at 222 ("In the majority of states, however, a stipulation of wages due for a specified
period of service did not create a definite period of employment.").
47. JACOBY, supra note 15, at 116 (citing 18 R.C.L. 509 (1917)).
48. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has indicated its rejection of rate-of-pay as re-
cently as the case of Booth v. McDonnell Douglas Truck Serv., 585 A.2d 24, 27 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991). Rate-of-pay is adopted by statute, however, in Montana and South Dakota. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-602 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-1-4, 60-2-7, 60-1-3
(1978 and Supp. 1983).
49. See supra text accompanying note 41.
50. Jones v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 145 A. 80 (Pa. 1928); Hogle v. DeLong Hook &
Eye Co., 94 A. 190 (Pa. 1915); King v. Steiren, 44 Pa. 99, 105 (1862); see Greene v. Oliver
Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur denied, 536 A.2d 1131
(Pa. 1987), for the proposition that courts should enforce contracts "for life;" see also Lu-
cacher v. Kerson, 45 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946), affd, 48 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946); Philadel-
phia Packing & Provision Cos Estate, 4 Pa. 57, 61 (1893).
Central to the development of the cause of action is the growing recognition that
the terminable-at-will rule, whether viewed as a rule of substantive law or a rule
of construction, conflicts with the true expectation of the parties and exposes
employees to abuse. Courts recognizing the action for retaliatory discharge have
grown increasingly outspoken in challenging the premises of the at-will rule and
acknowledging the injustice it engenders.
HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 39, at 252.
96 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1992
continue? Is this belief reasonable enough for him to rely on it, per-
haps to buy a house, or to forego other employment opportunities? If
it is reasonable to act on such a belief, could it not be reasonable for
the law to presume that absent any express language to the contrary,
that the parties intended their employment relation to be terminable
only in good faith or for just cause? 5 Only Massachusetts, Alaska,
Oregon, and Montana have adopted the view that good faith or just
cause are required in all discharges. 2
Another plausible presumption in cases where the duration of
the employment contract is not specified by the parties is that they
intended the contract to last for a reasonable time. 53 Although courts
have adhered to a rule of reasonableness in many other areas of the
law, such as sales of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, 4
negligence, and anti-trust,55 they seem loathe to rely on a similar
standard for resolving conflicts in the employment sphere. How
Pennsylvania has addressed -this issue will be discussed below.
51. America seems to be the only industrialized country with the at-will doctrine. See
HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 39, at 252; Kramer, supra note 7 at 243 n.79; see also
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481, 508-19 (1976); cf. Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 84 A.2d 323, 325 (Pa. 1951) ("If
the employee obtains no promise of employment for a definite or reasonable length of time, he
gambles on his retention and the probability that the employment will be continued if his
services are satisfactory.").
52. Kramer, supra note 7, at 250. Kramer interprets Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Stan-
dard Pump-Aldrich Division, 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), to mean that just cause is
now the standard in Pennsylvania. Kramer, supra note 7, at 251. This view has been rejected
in subsequent Superior Court decisions as a misreading of Yaindl. See infra text accompany-
ing note 84.
53. In Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 580 A.2d 1356, 1359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
allocatur denied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1991), the Superior Court found that the totality of the
circumstances of the employee's hiring supported a verdict of an implied contract for a reason-
able time. These circumstances included: his age, the position he accepted, statements made at
his hiring, the extent of retirement benefits, the opportunities foregone, and the costs of mov-
ing. ld; see supra text accompanying note 1. For other cases in which such a presumption
could be supported by the facts see Price v. Confair, 79 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1951); Rossmassler v.
Spielberg, 112 A. 876 (Pa. 1921); Nolle v. Mutual Union Brewing Co., 108 A. 23 (Pa. 1919);
Weidman v. United Cigar Stores Co., 72 A. 377 (Pa. 1909); Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491,
494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Darlington
v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
54. The concept of reasonableness appears consistently throughout the Code. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 206, and 207 (1990), and the "gap filler" provisions of §§ 2-305, 306, 308,
and 309 (1990).
55. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and
its progeny, in which the Court articulates a "rule of reason" for determining whether a re-
straint of trade is in violation of the Sherman Act of 1890, although the Act, on its face,
makes all restraints of trade illegal.
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C. The Pennsylvania Experience
1. Pre-1877: Prior to Wood's Treatise on the Law of Master
and Servant.-The Pennsylvania courts first expounded the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine in the 1864 case of Peacock v. Cummings.56
"Though the defendant was hired to be the publisher of a newspaper
with no term stipulated, the articles of copartnership provided that
the publisher could be hired for no more than five years.1 57 He was
discharged, however, after two years. 58 The court held that employ-
ment is at-will unless intended by the parties to be for a definite
time 59 and found the averments of fact to be deficient in establishing
such intention.60 In other words, the language "no more than five
years" sets no minimum, but only a maximum term of employment.
In Coffin v. Landis,"1 a case reported with Peacock and citing
the latter, the plaintiff was employed as an agent for the sale of par-
cels of land and was to be paid on a commission basis.62 As in Pea-
cock, no duration was set forth.6 3 The court focused on a term in the
written agreement that "while the plaintiff was engaged in the busi-
ness he undertook, he should not engage in other occupations, and
that no other assistant should be procured."" The court gleaned
from this language6 5 that the parties intended the employment to be
at-will, noting that it "would have been more natural" to have stated
a definite term if one was contemplated. 6
What was rapidly becoming a presumption was restated in the
1869 case of Kirk v. Hartman.17 Two essential elements of the Pea-
cock-Coffin analysis were relied on: (1) the intention of the parties
controls; and (2) when the parties do not indicate any contrary in-
56. 46 Pa. 434 (1864). The Peacock case was not supposed to have been reported, but
the citation of it in its companion case, Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426 (1864), resulted in its
publication.
57. Peacock, 46 Pa. at 434-35.
58. Id. at 435.
59. Id. at 437.
60. Id.
61. 46 Pa. 426 (1864). Both Coffin and Peacock cited only English authority.
62. Id. at 431.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 433.
65. Id. The court interpreted the language, "While [the agent] is engaged" to indicate
an understanding that this might be a temporary arrangement.
66. Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 433 (1864). Though the court distinguished this case
from one of continuous employment in that the agency created was for the sale of a particular
tract of land, read together with Peacock, the court had begun to develop a policy of finding
employment to be at-will in the absence of a contrary intention. These cases were cited by
WOOD. supra note 29, as support for the "inflexible" rule that an indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at-will.
67. 63 Pa. 97 (1869).
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tention, the employment is at-will.6 8
2. 1877 to 1974: From Wood to Geary.--In the first post-
187769 Pennsylvania case to consider the employer's right to dis-
charge his employees, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed
Wood's rule without citing him or any other authority. The court in
Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co.7" stated:
The right to [suspend or discharge] . . .was not, and could not
well be, disputed, without a greater shock to the relations of em-
ployer and employe[e] than we are disposed to sanction. A rail-
road corporation, or an individual, may discharge an employe[e]
with or without cause at pleasure, unless restrained by some
contract, so that I do not see that the questions of malice7 and
want of probable cause have anything to do with the case.
72
As in the cases pre-dating Wood, the court posits the at-will
presumption, while acknowledging that the parties are free to create
a more binding contract.
From Henry73 in 1891 until the landmark case of Geary v.
United States Steel Corp.74 in 1974, the Pennsylvania courts reaf-
firmed the presumption of at-will employment consistently and
often.75 However, such reaffirmations invariably were qualified by
68. Id. at 105. Kirk was cited as recently as 1985 for its role as an early authority for
the at-will presumption. See Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 502 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985). An often overlooked case, Kirk is also authority for the proposition that the at-will
presumption can be overcome by a rate-of-pay theory. See supra text accompanying note 47.
69. That is, after the appearance of Wood's treatise. See WOOD, supra note 29.
70. 21 A. 157 (1891). In Henry, a case similar on its facts to the more recent cases of
Gillespie v. St. Joseph's Univ., 513 A.2d 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) and Cisco v. United Parcel
Services, Inc., 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), the allegation that the plaintiff was dis-
charged after being suspected of fraud against the company, even though cleared in an investi-
gation, was not found sufficient to overcome the presumption and a compulsory nonsuit. Henry,
21 A. at 157.
71. For the development of the doctrine that malice has "anything to do with the case,"
see infra text accompanying note 85.
72. Henry v. Pittsburgh Lake Erie R.R. Co., 21 A. 157 (Pa. 1891). Though some com-
mentators credit the Henry court with creating the at-will presumption in Pennsylvania, the
court was in fact following the doctrine of Kirk v. Hartman, 63 Pa. 97 (1869); Peacock v.
Cummings, 46 Pa. 434 (1864); and Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426 (1864). See, e.g., Weiss,
supra note 22, at 1118.
73. Henry, 21 A. 157.
74. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
75. Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 84 A.2d 323, 325 (Pa. 1951); Trainer v. Laird, 183
A. 40 (Pa. 1936) (contract for a stipulated rate for three years and "thereafter" indicates a
contract of indefinite duration); Jones v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 145 A. 80 (Pa. 1928);
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Carey, 128 A. 539 (Pa. 1925); Haldeman v. Read Mach. Co., 80 Pa.
578, 580 (1923); Hogle v. DeLong Hook & Eye Co., 94 A. 190 (Pla. 1915) (salary per year
payable in monthly installments); Press P. Co. v. Reading N. Agency, 44 Pa. 428, 433 (1910)
(exclusive agency not specifying a definite time is terminable at any time); Weidman v. United
Cigar Stores Co., 72 A. 377 (Pa. 1909); Corgan v. George F. Lee Coal Co., 67 A. 655, 656
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the notion that the presumption could be overcome by express or
implied intentions of a contract for a definite term. On occasion the
courts have held that, looking at all the circumstances, there was
enough evidence to rebut the presumption and take the case to the
jury.
76
3. 1974 to the Present: Geary and Beyond.-In Geary v.
United States Steel Corp.7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recog-
nized "that economic conditions have changed radically since the
time of Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad."78 The change
that concerned the court was the increasing dependence of employ-
ees upon their jobs for their means of livelihood.79
Noting that the Henry doctrine was in conformity with the
great weight of authority,8" the court went on to state that "[a]bsent
a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the law has
taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an employ-
ment relationship for any or no reason."8" This is more than a mere
(Pa. 1907) (contract for a definite term subject to the satisfaction of the employer is termina-
ble for any or no reason); Lucacher v. Kerson, 45 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946), affd, 48
A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946); Howard v. Siegel, 184 A. 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936). See Common-
wealth v. Clark, 14 Pa. 435 (1900), for the proposition that freedom of contract precludes the
legislature from acting to alter the at-will nature of the employment relation. The Act of June
4, 1897, P.L. 116, prohibiting discharge for belonging to a labor union was held unconstitu-
tional. Id. But see Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974) ("The
notion that substantive due process elevates an employer's privilege of hiring and discharging
his employees to an absolute constitutional right has long since been discredited.").
76. See Jacobs v. Kraft Cheese Co., 164 A. 774 (Pa. 1933) (contract for employee to
produce a product so long as it was "satisfactory to the market" held not terminable at-will if
the product is satisfactory); Jones v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 145 A. 80 (Pa. 1928) (annual
profit-sharing plan, election of employee as secretary and treasurer held sufficient to create a
jury question of whether the contract was annual); Trainer v. Trainer Spinning Co., 73 A. 8
(Pa. 1909) (express contract for five years duration required just cause for discharge); Weid-
man v. United Cigar Stores Co., 72 A. 377 (Pa. 1909) (employment entered into as considera-
tion for sale of the employee's business to the employer); Philadelphia Packing & Provisions
Cos. Estate, 4 Pa. 57, 61 (1893) (finding annual employment where corporation secretary was
elected to that position for a year and was also appointed chief accountant at an annual salary
to be paid in monthly installments, but was later changed to weekly installments with no defi-
nite term of employment stated) (citing Kirk v. Hartman, 63 Pa. 97 (1869)); cf. Lubrecht v.
Laurel Stripping Co., 127 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1956); Smith v. Shallcross, 69 A.2d 156 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1949) (following Kirk'v. Hartman, 63 Pa. 97 (1869) and ignoring Hogle v. DeLong Hook
& Eye Co., 94 A. 190 (Pa. 1915) and its progeny in finding that annual salary to be paid in 26
annual installments and a "settlement" of commissions indicated intention to form annual con-
tract); Lucacher v. Kerson, 45 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946), affid, 48 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946);
Howard v. Siegel, 184 A. 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936).
77. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
78. Id. at 176; see supra note 59.
79. Geary, 319 A.2d at 176. The court quoted FRANK TANNENBAUM. A PHILOSOPHY OF
LABOR 9 (1951), quoted in Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
80. Geary, 319 A.2d at 176.
81. Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
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recitation of the general rule. 2 Read in the context of the case, the
court seems to be hinting that perhaps it is no longer appropriate to
take this power for granted.
8 3
Unlike most of the pre-Geary cases reaching appellate courts,
here the employee did not try to argue that the facts indicated a
contract of employment for a definite term. Rather, acknowledging
that the employment was at-will,8 4 Geary's complaint sounded in
tort, asserting that "the company's conduct in so acting was 'wrong-
ful, malicious and abusive.' "5 In essence, Geary asked the court to
place judicial restrictions on the employer's right to discharge at-
will. He advanced two distinct theories for his cause of action: (1)
discharge for wrongful motive, and (2) discharge in contravention of
public policy.86
The court acknowledged the venerable prcinciple that what
would otherwise be permissible can be turned into tortious conduct
by a malicious motive.8 7 The equally venerable corollary, however, is
that to be actionable the conduct complained of must involve an ele-
ment of "specific intent to cause harm or accomplish an ulterior
purpose."88
Geary argued "that he was acting in the best interests of the
general public as well as of his employer in opposing the marketing
of a product which he believed to be defective."8 9 The court recog-
nized the possibility of a public policy limitation on the employer's
power to discharge,9" but held that if a plausible and legitimate rea-
son for terminating an at-will employment relalionship is provided
and no clearly proscribed public policy is violated by the reason, an
employee at-will has no right of action against his employer for
wrongful discharge.91 The court cited with favor California and Indi-
82. Cf. Decker, supra note 75, at 104 n.6.
83. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974).
84. Id. at 175.
85. Id. Geary, a salesman for United States Steel, alleged that he was discharged be-
cause he voiced misgivings about a new product's safety, bypassing his immediate supervisors
and going directly to the company vice-president in charge of sales of the product. He also
alleged that as a result of his efforts the product was withdrawn from the market. Id.
86. Id. at 177-78.
87. Id. at 175-77; see Corgan v. George F. Lee Coal Co., 67 A. 655, 656 (Pa. 1907), for
an early indication that a malicious discharge might be actionable in the context of a contract
"for so long as the employee performs satisfactorily."
88. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 117 (Pa. 1974). Neither was
found in Geary. The court inferred from the complaint that "Geary had made a nuisance of
himself, and that the company discharged him to preserve administrative order in its own
house." Id. at 178.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 180.
91. Id.
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ana cases that recognized the public policy doctrine, but limited its
application to statutorily conferred rights.
9 2
In the eighteen years since Geary was decided, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has been relatively quiet,93 and the state legislature
silent, 94 on the issue of at-will employment, leaving to the lower ap-
pellate courts and the federal courts the task of shaping the legal
character of the employment relationship in Pennsylvania.95
Six years after Geary, in the case of Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand,9"
the Pennsylvania Superior Court set forth five factors to be balanced
in determining whether a discharge is proper: (1) the employee's in-
terest in making a living; (2) the employer's interest in running his
business; (3) the employer's motive in discharging the employee; (4)
the manner of effecting the discharge; and (5) the public policies
implicated. 97
92. Id. at 180 n.16 and citations therein.
93. Although there have been a handful of employment-at-will cases that the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court has decided very recently, they do not provide very coherent and concise
guidelines for the lower courts to follow. They do, however, indicate that the high court is not
on the verge of expanding employee protection. See Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346
(Pa. 1990); Clay v. Advanced Computer Application, 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989).
94. Several statutes provide limited protection for at-will employees. 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4563 (1991) forbids termination when an employee is called for jury duty. 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a) (Supp. 1991) protects employees who must appear in court as
victims of or witnesses to a crime. 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1421-28 (1991) affords protec-
tion to "whistle blowers" who are employed by public entities.
None of these statutes, however, would provide the kind of comprehensive protection in-
tended by H. 2154, a bill currently under consideration in the Pennsylvania House of Repre-
sentatives. This bill, if enacted, would prohibit any employer from dismissing an employee
except for "just cause," a concept not defined in the bill. The bill would also require written
notice of the reasons for discharge. The bill further provides for mediation and binding arbitra-
tion of any dispute regarding the discharge. The bill was referred to the Committee on Labor
Relations on November 13, 1991.
95. For a discussion of the role played by federal courts in developing the at-will doc-
trine in Pennsylvania, see Kramer, supra note 7.
96. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Division, 422 A.2d 611 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980).
97. Id. at 620. One commentator has argued that the holding of Yaindl is tantamount to
creating a just cause requirement for discharge of an at-will employee in Pennsylvania. See
Kramer, supra note 7, at 250. The Superior Court rejected this interpretation of Yaindl, reaf-
firming the vitality of the at-will presumption. Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 502 A.2d 637
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). The Superior Court in Banas interpreted Yaindl to be saying that it is a
serious violation of an employee's right to interfere with future employment prospects, but
believed the court fell short of creating a just cause requirement for discharges. Id. at 645 n.7.
By recognizing that the motive for and manner of affecting the discharge are significant
and that public policy may be affected by private employment contracts, the court is signaling
that employment is not entirely a contractual relation, but rather that employment gives rise to
civic duties not voluntarily assumed, the breach of which are to be determined under tort
theory. As this tort liability has become widely recognized, it has supplanted contract as the
favored theory for redressing wrongful employer conduct. It is the inapplicability of tort theory
to many employee relocation cases, however, that necessitates a new look at contract
principles.
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In 1986 in the case of Darlington v. General Electric,98 the
court again took stock of the at-will presumption, finding it to be
somewhat dismantled but largely intact.99 At the conclusion of a far-
reaching, comprehensive opinion that considered virtually every facet
of and exception to the at-will presumption, the court stated:
The policy underlying the at-will presumption mandates that
where there is no contract to rebut the at-will presumption, and
where no public policy has been violated by the discharge, we
must weigh the employer's interest in running his business more
heavily than all the other interests. Inherent in the at-will pre-
sumption is an important public policy that the employer should
be master of his business. 100
In Yaindl,'0 ' the court had attempted to strike a balance be-
tween the interests of employers and employees. This is a process
typical of courts when looking at contracts. That court recognized
the truism that each party to a contract has interests worthy of pro-
tecting, and these interests must be balanced in a specific case. The
Darlington court, with no analytical justification, stipulated that the
employer's interests must be given greater weight. than those of the
employee."0 2 Does the court assume that the employer stands to lose
more than the employee? Or does the court believe that society in
general benefits from favoring employers over employees? Though
the Darlington court does not explicitly reject the five-factor analysis
of Yaindl, it detours from that analysis, and to date no panel of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has returned to the route Yaindl had
opened. Though it occasionally supports the potential for tort theory
to overcome the at-will presumption, it gives faint hope to those who
would rely on contract theory.103
98. Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
99. Id. at 310. "Courts have, in fact, only impinged on the presumption in gradual,
piecemeal ways . . . . The citadel of the at-will presumption has been eroded of late, but it
has not been toppled." Id.
100. Id. at 320.
101. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Division, 422 A.2d 611 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980).
102. Darlington, 504 A.2d at 320.
103. Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). The court
discusses the contract theories of consideration and promissory estoppel, but indicates that for
the most part these theories are unlikely to overcome the presumption in the typical case.
"[T]he mere fact that an employee surrendered his or her former position does not necessarily
suggest that the employer-promisor should have contemplated such reliance." Id. The court
suggests that tort theories such as discharge based on actual malice and those that offend
public policy could be useful to an employee-plaintiff. In contract law, public policy is often
cited as a reason to avoid a contract, but seldom as a reason to find one to exist contrary to the
intentions of the parties. See, e.g., In the Matter of Baby M, 52,7 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)
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Henry,104 Geary,10 5 and Darlington'°" continue to be cited for
the proposition that the employment-at-will presumption is alive and
well. 10 7 In the following sections of this Article, the argument will be
made that contract as well as tort theories should be expanded to
provide a more equitable balance of power between employer and
employee, without diminishing the efficiency of the business
enterprise.
III. Overcoming the At-Will Presumption in Pennsylvania: Con-
tractual Issues
Should the employer's freedom to run his business be the cen-
tral principle of employment law, as the court in Darlington°10 sug-
gested, or is it merely one principle to be weighed against competing
principles, such as the employee's interest in making a living, as
Yaind 10 9 suggested? Is it a principle necessary to our economic well-
being, or has it simply been glorified beyond analysis or criticism by
the processes of tradition and habit?10
In other areas of contract law, courts and legislatures have de-
veloped principles that compete with and limit freedom of contract.
The purpose of these principles is to protect ordinary individuals in
their contracts with parties who are in superior bargaining positions,
such as manufacturers, landlords, merchants, insurance agencies,
and creditors."' These adversaries do battle in the economic arena,
just as employers and employees do. Why, then, should the law of
employment contracts have "developed contrary to all of the stan-
(contract of surrogate motherhood was invalidated by the New Jersey Supreme Court as being
contrary to the public policy against accepting money for adoption).
104. Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 21 A. 157 (Pa. 1891).
105. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1974).
106. Darlington, 504 A.2d at 306.
107. See also McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878, 881 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (citing Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 21 A. 157 (Pa. 1891)).
108. Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
109. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Division, 422 A.2d 611 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980). Recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court indicated that the employer's
right to carry on his business as he sees fit includes the absolute privilege to publish defama-
tory matter in notices of employment termination, regardless of whether the allegations are
true and regardless of the motive behind the dismissal. However, any further publication
would be actionable. Thus, contrary to a growing trend in other states, the Pennsylvania court
rejects the notion of "compelled self-defamation" resulting from an employee being obligated
to repeat the defamatory statements made by the terminating employer to new potential em-
ployers. Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). For
decisions of other states, see cases cited in the Yetter decision. Id. at 1025.
110. See WILLIAMS G. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906) for a general discussion of the atti-
tudes of the masses toward the criticism of ingrained values, such as democracy.
I ll. HOLLOWAY AND LEECH. supra note 39, at ix.
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dard, modern contract principles"?" 2
The principles of good faith 13 and unconscionability" 4 have a
significant impact on modern commercial law, but have traditionally
been largely ignored in the employment context in favor of the com-
peting values of freedom of contract and managerial discretion." 5
However, the Pennsylvania courts have slowly come to realize that
"the dominant philosophy of freedom of contract failed to consider
the lack of bargaining power in an individual employee, i.e., that
there can be no freedom of contract between parties of grossly une-
qual bargaining power. ' ' 16
Although the Pennsylvania courts have indicated their unease in
abrogating the at-will presumption entirely, they have long shown a
willingness to recognize a contrary intention when there is clear evi-
dence to support it."' Recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
acknowledging the potential for abuse of power that comes from the
superior bargaining position of the employer, cautioned that the at-
will doctrine should not be an implement through which the em-
ployer can fashion snares for the unsuspecting employee." 8 Though
the courts" 9 and at least one commentator'2" have questioned
whether the at-will presumption might not be :more appropriately
modified by legislative mandate rather than abrogated in piecemeal
fashion by "judicial erosion,"'' the latter is nonetheless occurring as
the legislature lies quiescent. The moving force behind this erosion is
the belated recognition that the economic and social factors which
112. Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Pa. Super. 1987), allocatur
denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987). For example, the Uniform Commercial Code provides,
"Where the contract provides for successive performances but is indefinite in duration it is
valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time."
U.C.C. § 2-309(2) (1990). Section 2-309(3) requires, however, that reasonable notice be
given. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (1990). This is not wholly foreign to the prevailing employment
doctrine.
113. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
114. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
115. Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
116. Id. The court went on to state, however, "All manner of contracts are formed be-
tween parties of unequal bargaining strength. The law of contract. has traditionally acted as
umpire to contractual disputes - that is, it does not reassign the players to even-out teams,
but insures that the game is played fairly, regardless of the disparity of bargaining power." Id.
at 316.
117. Kirk v. Hartman & Co., 63 Pa. 97 (1869); King & Gr2.ham v. Steiren, 44 Pa. 99,
105 (1862); Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), alloca-
tur denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987); Smith v. Shallcross, 69 A.2d 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949).
118. Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 543 A.2d 1148, 1154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
119. Darlington, 504 A.2d at 310.
120. Kurt H. Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania--A Proposal For Its Aboli-
tion and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REv. 477, 479 (1983).
121. Id.
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caused employment law to develop its own peculiar doctrines no
longer exist.122
Though it may be feasible to develop tort theories 2 ' to protect
the employee from the abuse of employer power, it is suggested here
that such principles would apply only to a small percentage of dis-
charge cases. For the remaining cases, the courts could use existing
contract principles to serve as safeguards for the rights of both par-
ties to the employment relation. Though other contract principles
may be applicable, the present discussion will be limited to three of
them: consideration, promissory estoppel, and unconscionability.
A. Consideration
Consideration can be defined as a legal detriment that has been
bargained for and exchanged for a promise that was made to induce
the detriment. 24 Economic inadequacy does not prevent any bar-
gained for detriment from constituting consideration.12 5 Courts have
often expressed the concept in terms of mutuality of obligation, hold-
ing that only when both parties are similarly bound is a promise
binding. In the employment context, the employer promises to pay
wages and the employee promises to work.'26 According to the tradi-
tional view of the indefinite employment relationship, the employer
makes a unilateral offer of wages in exchange for the employee's
labor, continuously accepted by that labor, but capable of with-
drawal at any time. 2' This view, if adopted, leads inescapably to the
conclusion that the employment is terminable at-will. Each day is a
new contract on these terms: a day's work for a day's pay. No agree-
ment for the future is established.
In cases where the employee has argued the existence of an ex-
press or implied promise of continued employment, courts have often
held that such a promise is unenforceable unless supported by addi-
tional consideration above and beyond the employee's labor. 128 Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, the labor is given only for the prom-
122. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974).
123. See supra text accompanying note 85.
124. JOHN D. CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M. PERILLO. LAW OF CONTRACTS 187-89 (3d ed.
1987).
125. Id. at 192.
126. See Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987),
allocatur denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987), for the proposition that mutuality of obligation is
inapplicable to the employment relation.
127. Kramer, supra note 7, at 244; see also Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 502 A.2d
637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
128. See, e.g., Lubrecht v. Laurel Stripping Co., 127 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1956); Lucacher v.
Kerson, 45 A.2d 254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 48 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946).
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ised wages.129 The employee gives nothing in exchange for the
guaranteed term, and so it fails due to lack of consideration. 130
Strengthening this view is the idea that mutuality of obligation exists
between the employee's freedom to quit without notice and the em-
ployer's ability to discharge. 131 Burdening the employer with the ad-
ditional obligation of guaranteed employment without some further
promise by the employee,"3 2 violates the concept of mutuality of
obligation.
1 33
At least one commentator considers this view to be hyper-tech-
nical and based on circular logic.13" The better view is to recognize
that traditional contract principles allow for a single consideration
(labor) to suffice for a group of promises (wages, pensions, benefits,
and job security). 35 The inquiry should be whether the parties in-
tended that the labor would be consideration for both the wages and
the promise of job security. Pennsylvania courts have *acknowledged
this principle, as stated for example in Greene v. Oliver Realty,
Inc. 1
36
An employer is free to promise lifetime employment to
someone in exchange for that person coming to work for the em-
ployer. Once that person accepts and starts work, the employer
has received exactly what he bargained for. The employee has
performed the desired act. That act is the consideration for the
employer's promise and their agreement is a unilateral contract.
It is irrelevant that the employee's services are also considera-
tion for his salary. Modern contract law recognizes that consid-
eration may be a single act exchanged for several promises
... "I The employer and employee need not b- obligated for
coextensive periods of time. The law does not require
129. Kramer, supra note 7, at 244.
130. Kramer, supra note 7, at 244.
131. Kramer, supra note 7, at 244.
132. Such as the mutual promise not to quit for a like period of time.
133. Kramer, supra note 7, at 244.
134. HOLLOWAY AND LEECH, supra note 39, at 45. The logic can be presented in this
simplified form: (1) because the employment is terminable at-will by the employee, she gives
no consideration for the employer's promise; and (2) because no consideration was given, the
employment is terminable at-will (by the employer). This logic is similar to that surrounding
the invalidation of escape clauses in common law contracts, on the theory that if one party is
able to escape, his promise is illusory, there is no mutuality of obligation, and therefore the
other party is also able to escape. Should this reasoning apply even though one party may have
specifically bargained for the escape clause, perhaps providing other inducements in exchange
for it?
135. HOLLOWAY AND LEECH, supra note 39, at 45.
136. Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur de-
nied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987).
137. Id. at 1197.
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equivalency of consideration. Therefore, the employee may be
bound for one period of time though the employer is bound for
much longer.' 38
When consideration other than work is given in exchange for
employment, this circumstance can be indicative of the intention of
the parties that the contract is not terminable at-will." 9 On the
other hand, following the principle articulated in Greene, a promise
of a definite term of employment needs no additional consideration
to be binding. Moreover, the employment-at-will presumption could
be overcome by clear evidence of a contrary intent even without ad-
ditional consideration, though its presence is persuasive in rebutting
the presumption. 4"
Would it be reasonable to recognize that the employee's acts of
giving up job offers or a present position, moving to another city, and
making other related life-changes constitute consideration for an im-
plied promise of employment for a reasonable time?14' Courts that
have addressed similar issues in other contexts have usually consid-
ered such actions to be "preparing to perform" rather than consider-
ation for the employer's benefit. 4 As applied in the employment
context, this doctrine would lead to the conclusion that the employer
is bargaining for work, not for changes in the employee's situation.
This is a hyper-technical application of consideration theory.
The employer typically knows full well what measures the prospec-
tive employee will have to take in order to perform the bargain.
Often the employer shows this knowledge by offering to pay for mov-
ing expenses, or agreeing to keep job inquiries confidential. The bet-
138. Id. at 1198.
139. Id. at 1200; Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 314 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986). This is simply a presumption that could be overcome by evidence that the parties still
intended that the employment would be at-will, even though additional consideration was pro-
vided by the employee.
140. Greene, 526 A.2d at 1200; see Lucacher v. Kerson, 45 A.2d 254 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1946), aff'd, 48 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946). It could be argued that if the employer is bound to the
contract for a definite period, but the employee is free to quit at any time, that the employee's
promise is illusory. Therefore, she has given no consideration for the employer's promise. This
argument, however, can be overcome by inferring an implied promise to give notice before
quitting, or an implied promise of good faith. It should not be overlooked that an employee
suddenly leaving her job without notice or in bad faith may also cause harm to the employer.
It would be fair for a mutual obligation to be placed on the employee of good faith or notice if
the employer is to be bound to a term of employment by some consideration found to have
been given by the employee. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 228-30.
141. Courts should not be as reluctant to find an employment contract to be for a rea-
sonable time as they are to find an implied promise of employment for life. See Greene v.
Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur denied, 536 A.2d
1331 (Pa. 1987).
142. See. e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
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ter view is that the total package the employer is bargaining for is
the relocated employee with no other employment commitments. The
view that the only consideration the employee provides is her labor in
exchange for her salary ignores much of what is actually understood
by both parties to the employment contract.
In Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 4 a two judges of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court broke new ground in finding that an
implied contract for a reasonable time could be based largely on the
"consideration" of giving up another job, moving, and buying and
selling real estate so that Scullion, the plaintiff employee, would be
positioned for his new employment situation."' The dissent, how-
ever, argued that the detriment suffered by Scullion was "identical
with that of the majority of today's salaried professionals."' 45 Thus,
the dissent is saying that only consideration which is out of the ordi-
nary will be sufficient to take an employment relation out of employ-
ment-at-will. No justification is given by the dissenting judge, how-
ever, for requiring extraordinary consideration in this context when
in other areas of commercial law virtually any amount or kind of
consideration suffices. It is difficult to predict whether the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, or for that matter the other justices of the Supe-
rior Court, will ultimately adopt the rationale of the Scullion
majority.1" 6
Courts applying the employment-at-will doctrine further fail to
recognize that employees invest their human capital in the business,
along with their labor, and that this investment is itself a form of
consideration. Courts have been slow to recognize the commitment
that career employees make to the employer. Accepting a job with a
company has implications for the employee's career that are far
reaching. Employees become identified with the success or failure of
the business. They must depend on the employer for references for
other jobs. Termination without cause can taint an employee's record
143. 580 A.2d 1356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allocatur denied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1991);
see supra text accompanying note 1.
144. As recently as 1986, the Pennsylvania Superior Court heId in Veno v. Meredith,
515 A.2d 571, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), that an employee who had turned down other job
offers, had given up his existing job, and had moved his family from Newark, New Jersey to
Pennsylvania had not given an) consideration beyond that normally incurred by similar types
of salaried professionals.
145. Scullion, 580 A.2d at 1362.
146. One potential clue, however, is the denial of allocatur in Scullion by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court. It is just this kind of uncertainty in the law that prompts calls for the
legislature to act. See Kurt H. Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania After Banas and
Darlington: New Concerns for a Legislative Solution, 32 VILL. L. REV. 101 (1987) and the
MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT (1991), supra note 5.
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almost as much as one with cause because prospective employers
wonder what really motivated the discharge. As they age, employees
may have fewer career options. They might feel obligated to stay on,
even though they would rather not, in order to retain their pensions.
Thus, the decision to obtain/maintain employment with a certain
employer involves much more than a mere exchange of labor for
wages. Perhaps these additional detriments could be viewed as con-
sideration for an implied promise of employment for a reasonable
time.
B. Promissory Estoppel
The doctrine of promissory estoppel exists to protect the reli-
ance interest.14 7 Even if moving one's family, giving up other em-
ployment or job offers, and selling and buying homes do not techni-
cally constitute consideration for a promise of employment, 4 8 they
are actions often taken in reliance on just such a promise.1 49 Though
the express contract of employment may be silent as to its duration,
it might not be unreasonable in certain cases, given the extent of the
employee's change of position, to infer a promise of employment for
a reasonable duration. Even though it could be argued that the em-
ployer is not bargaining for these actions, in the sense that by them-
selves they are of no use to the employer without the employee's
labor, the employer knows that they are often the likely result of the
employee's reliance on the promise of employment, whether express
or implied. 5 '
When business people rely to their detriment on the promises of
others, the courts are often sympathetic to the harm caused and are
willing to see it as injustice. 51 Why have courts, then, been so un-
willing to apply this doctrine to the reliance of employees?1 52
147. CALAMARI AND PERILLO. supra note 124, at 271.
148. These actions would be considered "preparation rather than the beginning of per-
formance." CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 286; see supra text accompanying
note 141.
149. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965). In this
often-cited case, Hoffman expected to be granted a supermarket franchise, and as requested by
Red Owl Stores, he sold another business and moved his family. Id. at 269. Although these
acts did not constitute consideration, the court did find that Hoffman relied on the promise of
a potential franchise and changed his position to his detriment. Id. at 275. One may wonder
how this case would have been decided if the reliance had been the same, but the offer had
been for a position as manager rather than for the sale of a franchise. Would the court be as
sympathetic to an employee's reliance as they were to a businessman's?
150. CALAMARI AND PERILLO. supra note 124, at 274.
151. The doctrine has been applied, for example, to bids of subcontractors and promises
to obtain loans.
152. The doctrine has, in fact, been applied by a few courts to the issue of promises to
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To say that the employees also have freedom of contract and
could insist on a fixed term if that is what they desire is to ignore
reality for significant segments of the work-force. There are few clas-
ses of persons who are so likely to be at a bargaining disadvantage as
are employees.153 Though some may have the leverage to insist on a
fixed duration in their employment contracts, many are in no posi-
tion to do so. This is especially true of recent college graduates,
transferees within a company, and others in highly competitive job
markets. Because they may be in an inferior bargaining position,
they need the protection of the courts from overreaching employ-
ers. 54 If an employer induces a potential employee to suffer the
hardship of relocating, severing ties, and giving tp offers or his pre-
sent job, the employer should be estopped from raising the defense
that the employment is at-will.
In determining whether promissory estoppel arises in a given
case, the court must focus on: 1) the existence of the promisor's
knowledge as to whether reliance will occur; and 2) whether injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 15  Both of these
elements would be present in any case in which the employer knows
either or both of these facts: 1) the prospective employee lives in a
distant city; 2) the prospective employee is currently employed or
has other offers. The knowledge that reliance will occur is clearly
imputed from knowledge of the employee's circumstances. The injus-
tice follows from the magnitude of the employee's reliance that is
routinely requested in the employment context compared to the
length of time the employment actually lasts.
The company that offers an employee a new job in a new city
induces a reliance interest much more significant than if the new
hire had been recruited from a local company. The company that
asks its own employee to transfer to a new city and very shortly
thereafter fires her creates a less significant reliance interest, in that
there is no previous employment foregone. Still, this person may
have suffered significant losses in real estate transactions, in personal
friendships, and in family sacrifices. The simple question is: Is the
knowing inducement of such losses sufficient to overcome the pre-
pay pension benefits. See, e.g., cases cited at CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 287
n.18.
153. Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). This is
especially true during recessionary economic times.
154. These circumstances also raise the issue of unconscionability. Compare U.C.C. § 2-
302 (1990) for the treatment of unconscionability in the commercial setting. See infra text
accompanying note 173.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1978).
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
sumption of employment-at-will? If the reliance is reasonable, if the
employer knew the employee would rely, then these seem to be ar-
chetypal cases of promissory estoppel.15 It would be unjust to allow
such reliance to be induced with no burdens placed on the employer
to prove, at the least, some reasonable justification for an abrupt
discharge.
The appropriate remedy in such a case could be to enforce an
implied contract of employment for a reasonable duration.157 Rea-
sonableness of duration should be measured in relation to the harm
suffered by the employee as a result of the detrimental reliance on
the employer's implied promises.
Under existing doctrine, the risk of loss in cases of employee
reliance such as those discussed here falls squarely on the em-
ployee.158 It would be more appropriate, however, to apply a rule of
risk allocation analogous to that adopted in other areas of contract
law. One example is the doctrine of commercial impracticability.
The risk of loss, when not explicitly placed on one party by the con-
tract, is assigned by law to the party more able to prevent the loss, or
the one more likely to insure against it. 59 This is an economically
efficient rule. It places the incentive to reduce potential injury on the
person who is in the best position to do so with the smallest expendi-
ture of resources. Likewise, in the sale of goods context, risk of loss
is placed, as a general principle, on the person in possession of the
goods, on the assumption that this is the party in the best position to
prevent loss or insure against it.160
156. In Darlington, the court, though speaking in terms of consideration, recognized the
potential application of promissory estoppel in the employment context, but refused to apply it
to the facts of that case.
Certainly, if the employee was induced to leave his former employment with the
assurance that he would not be dismissed without cause in the new employment,
there is a bargained-for-exchange amounting to consideration which binds the
new employer to its promise not to dismiss absent cause. In such a situation, the
promise induced the detriment and the detriment induced the promise so that
the necessary elements of consideration are present.
Darlington, 504 A.2d at 311.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1978).
158. We should not ignore the fact that the risk that the employee may quit her job
after the employer has incurred significant training costs is a real one, This type of risk is not,
however, necessarily implicated in the same cases in which employees have relied to their
detriment. It would appear, nonetheless, that if employee reliance supports a promise not to
discharge for a reasonable time, employer reliance would support a promise not to quit for a
reasonable time. In fact, it may become more common in the future for employers explicitly to
stipulate in the contract that employees who quit before a specified period must reimburse the
employer for training costs.
159. See CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 536-84.
160. U.C.C. §§ 2-509, 2-510 (1990). Risk of loss in this context is also affected by
breach of the contract for sale of the goods. The general principles of risk allocation are over-
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When an employee takes a new job, the employee is in a poor
position to foresee, prevent, or insure against the risk that the em-
ployment will be terminated without cause. The employee likely can-
not predict a slowdown in the employer's business and has no knowl-
edge of the employer's plans to expand or contract his business. The
employer, on the other hand, may have such knowledge. Plans for
reductions in force may already be formulated. Plant closings may
be on the agenda. The employer may be in a position to reduce detri-
mental reliance by communicating such knowledge or plans to the
prospective employee.
Under the existing rules, however, there is littl'e incentive for the
employer to do so because the employer is not liable for the harm
caused by the employee's reliance. In fact, there is a strong incentive
for the employer to keep such information hidden. The employer can
fill short run staffing needs, knowing that if in the long run the new
hires are not ultimately needed, they can be discarded with no at-
tendant liability for the detriments they have suffered. The existing
doctrine, therefore, is both unjust and inefficient. 16' Resources are
being shifted to unproductive uses by having employees relocate to
places where their services might not be needed for the long term.
After termination they are often left to find employment that makes
less efficient use of their full talents than the position given up ear-
lier. Placing the burden on the employer to bear the costs of such
dislocations will help to insure that the resulting inefficiencies will be
minimized.
The Scullion case"6 2 seems, on its facts, to be an appropriate
vehicle for the court to recognize that promissory estoppel is a valid
theory to overcome the at-will presumption. Because the provision by
the employee of additional consideration is recognized by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court as a reason for overcoming the presumption,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court characterizes Scullion's actions as
consideration for an implied promise of employment 6 3 rather than
as actions showing reasonable reliance on implied assurances of em-
ployment for a reasonable duration. Even if the assumption was
ridden by contrary agreement of the parties.
161. For a general discussion of the need to temper efficiency concerns with moral con-
cepts, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Christopher K.
Braun, Alternative Rhythms in Law and Economics: The Posner-Malloy Dialectic, XV:ll LE-
GAL STUDIES FORUM (1991).
162. Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 580 A.2d 1356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allocatur
denied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1991).
163. See supra text accompanying note 143 for discussion of Scullion's actions as suffi-
cient to constitute consideration.
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made, arguendo, that: 1) Scullion's conduct in giving up his position
and relocating did not satisfy the technical requirements of consider-
ation;"6 ' or 2) that the employee did no more than what any similar
employee would do, and therefore he gave no extraordinary consider-
ation,16 5 nevertheless his reliance to his detriment on the implied
promise of employment for a reasonable time, and the employer's
knowledge that he would so rely, are manifest. The employer should
therefore be estopped from denying the existence of such a contract.
-Though the court in Scullion did not refer to estoppel, it did in
actuality base its decision on a comparison of the hardship suffered
by Scullion to the short term of employment he ultimately re-
ceived. 66 The dissent based its opposition to finding consideration
under these facts on the mistaken belief that consideration requires
that either substantial benefit be afforded to the employer or sub-
stantial hardship imposed on the employee. 167 The court and the dis-
sent find themselves at odds because they failed to see this case as
one of promissory estoppel.'68 The dissent interprets the Supreme
164. Actions taken in preparation for performance are not bargained for and therefore
not consideration. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965);
see also supra text accompanying note 142.
165. As argued by the dissent in Scullion, 580 A.2d at 1362 (Olszewski, dissenting); see
also supra text accompanying note 144.
166. Scullion, 580 A.2d at 1359.
167. Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 580 A.2d 1356, 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
allocatur denied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1991).
168. The dissent in Scullion noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused, when
it had the opportunity, to create an equitable estoppel exception to at-will employment in the
case of Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990). Paul, a doctor, was fired for taking
refrigerators belonging to the hospital where he was employed. Id. at 346. The jury determined
that Paul had permission to remove the items in question. Id. at 347. The Superior Court held
that the employer could not rightfully discharge him for taking the equipment after agreeing
to its removal. Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 543 A.2d 1148, 1152 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The court
held granting permission for an act equated to a promise not to discharge him for committing
that act. Id. at 1154. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that as an employee-at-will, the
doctor could be terminated for any reason or for no reason. Paul, 569 A.2d at 348; see also
Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1990).
The facts of Scullion, however, do not raise the issue of equitable estoppel, but rather,
promissory estoppel, which, "unlike its equitable cousin, may serve as an independent cause of
action." Paul, 543 A.2d at 1152. Other states have long recognized the application of promis-
sory estoppel to analogous fact situations. For example, in Smith v. Theobald, 5 S.W. 394 (Ky.
1887), the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized that an employee was entitled to more than
a month's employment after moving himself and his family several hundred miles, though
there was no express contract for any length of time. In McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177,
181 (Haw. 1970), the court found that reliance was sufficient to overcome the statute of frauds
regarding oral promises of long-term employment. The reliance took the form of foregoing
other opportunities, selling belongings, moving from California to Hawaii, and leasing an
apartment. Id. at 178. The courts in these cases recognize that parties to employment con-
tracts are unlikely to undergo such dislocations in the absence of some understanding, not
necessarily explicit, that the employment is to be for a reasonable duration. McIntosh, 469
P.2d 177; Smith, 5 S.W. 394.
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Court's reluctance to embrace estoppel in Paul v. Lankenau Hospi-
tal169 as a signal that any such change in the law should be left to
the legislature.17 0 No reason is given there, however, for why the
court should be so indisposed to work changes in a common law doc-
trine that it has itself developed. This would be an especially troub-
ling abdication of the court's duty in light of the fact that the legis-
lature is not signalling any intention of acting in the near future. 17 1
Moreover, as more and more states develop distinct legislative pro-
grams, it becomes more likely that substantive employment rights
will vary from state to state. Efficiency is fostered, and uncertainty
reduced, by uniformity in the law. This is just as true in the employ-
ment context as it is in transactions in goods.'"
C. Unconscionability
The goal to be achieved by the principle of unconscionability is
"the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of distur-
bance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.
'173
The core of the doctrine is that the court should prevent the over-
reaching of one party to a contract by the other party. Such over-
reaching can occur through the placing of risks or burdens in a
transaction on a party who normally would not be expected to as-
sume them, especially when the risks or burdens were not knowingly
and voluntarily assumed. 74 Though inequality of bargaining power
does not by itself create unconscionability, it is an important element
in determining its presence in a contract.
17
169. 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990).
170. Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 580 A.2d 1356, 1362 n.l (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
allocatur denied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1991); see also Decker, supra note 146.
171. One may argue that such changes in the law should be postponed pending consider-
ation of the Model Employment Termination Act (1991). Even if the proposed Model Act
should be adopted in Pennsylvania, in its original form it would not cover cases such as Scul-
lion. It would apply only to employees who have been employed by the same employer for one
year or more. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 5, § 3. Uncovered employ-
ees retain any common-law rights to which they may be entitled. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TER-
MINATION ACT, supra note 5, § 2(d).
172. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 5, at 7.
173. Official comment to U.C.C. § 2-302, cited in CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note
124, at 399. Though not directly applicable to employment contracts, the U.C.C. comment is a
reasonable attempt to define unconscionability in a general way and seems helpful in this con-
text. In fact, many of the cases that contributed to the formation of the doctrine were not sales
of goods cases. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 403. Interestingly, although the
authors give a laundry list of non-sales areas in which the doctrine has been applied, they do
not mention contracts of employment.
174. CALAMARI AND PERILLO. supra note 124, at 407.
175. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 407. But see Darlington v. General
Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), which indicate; that Pennsylvania courts
have slowly come to realize that "the dominant philosophy of freedom of contract failed 1o
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Unconscionability is often classified as either substantive or non-
substantive. 7 Substantive unconscionability refers to unfair terms
in the agreement. 117 Nonsubstantive unconscionability refers to un-
fair bargaining practices or disparities in the status of the parties to
the contract. 171 In the business context, such as a case in which cus-
tomers are overreached by sellers, or tenants are overreached by
landlords, the courts have justified coming to the aid of the "op-
pressed party" with such notions as a lack of choice in the market,
1 79
or the weaker party's ignorance or lack of sophistication.180
From the point of view of traditional unconscionability analysis,
the employee who takes a new job requiring a transfer to another
city may not be ignorant and unsophisticated compared to a welfare
mother' 1 or the owner of a gas station with a grade school educa-
tion."8 2 The bargaining process may not have been one of "high pres-
sure" tactics. The employee may be aware of the essential terms of
the contract, at least on the surface. The transferred employee,
therefore, does not fit perfectly into the categories that have thus far
been recognized by courts or commentators'" as a victim of
unconscionability.
It is urged here, however, that there is an asymmetry of infor-
mation between employer and employee that should be recognized,
in certain cases, as a reason for protecting the employee from being
consider the lack of bargaining power in an individual employee, i.e., that there can be no
freedom of contract between parties of grossly unequal bargaining power."
176. CALAMARI AND PERILLO. supra note 124, at 399.
177. Such as consumer goods sold for an extremely high price compared to the fair
market value.
178. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 399.
179. Contracts in which oppressed parties are in such a poor bargaining position that
they cannot effectively negotiate the terms of a standardized contract, but must "take it or
leave it" on the other party's terms, are known as "contracts of adhesion." See Schecter v.
Watkins, 477 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allocatur denied, 584 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1990)
(holding that contracts of adhesion are unconscionable because they fail to represent an ex-
change bargained for at arm's length).
180. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 407. In the cases cited therein, the
courts show their willingness to protect non-English speakers, welfare recipients, and the less
educated. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 124, at 407.
181. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
182. See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
183. See, for example, Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
HARV. L, REV. 741 (1982). Eisenberg articulates four grounds for unconscionability: 1) dis-
tress (a promisor who is taken advantage of because he is in desperate straights); 2) transac-
tional incapacity (lacking the aptitude, experience, or judgment to make a well-informed deci-
sion); 3) unfair persuasion (high-pressure bargaining tactics); and 4) price ignorance
(exploitation of ignorance of alternative means of supply). Id. at 754-85. Eisenberg has made
great strides toward providing some structure and unity to the concept of unconscionability.
Though it would require an augmentation of his categories to cover the recently hired em-
ployee, Eisenberg was of the opinion that "unconscionability is a paradigmatic concept that
can never be exhaustively described." Id. at 754.
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overreached. Just as a seller of a home often knows more than a
prospective purchaser about the existence of latent defects, or a
seller of a used car knows more about the character of the car than a
prospective buyer, the employer generally knows considerably more
than the prospective employee about the health and character of the
company. 8
Consider a case in which a prospective employee is being pur-
sued by a firm that already knows it will be downsizing in the near
future. Perhaps this could be considered a form of transactional ig-
norance on the part of the employee. 8 5 The asymmetry of informa-
tion could be viewed as a market failure. 8' In the sale of a home or
car, the parties may be able to correct for the asymmetry through
voluntary exchange. They may bargain for a warranty to protect the
purchaser from the unknown defects.'8 7 In the employment context,
however, because of the disparity of bargaining power, the employee
is often unable to insist on such guarantees."8
While the parties to the employment relation are in the forma-
tion stage of their contract, the kind of information asymmetry
which exists is one of "redistributive facts." Unlike the discovery of
new information that can be used to create new wealth, redistribu-
tive facts only serve to create a bargaining advantage for the knowl-
edgeable party. 8 Allowing an employer to benefit from the use of
184. It could be argued that in negligence and strict liability law, the duty to warn is a
doctrine based on informational asymmetry. For example, the manufacturer of a product is
usually in a better position to know the dangers associated with that product. It would be
inefficient for the purchaser to investigate and obtain this information. The law imposes a duty
on the manufacturer or seller to warn. See generally ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 264 (1988) (discussing duty to disclose destructive facts, which is analo-
gous to the duty to warn of dangers on a negligence or strict liability theory); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 343A (1978) (owner of land is held to duty to warn
invitees of any dangerous condition he knows or should know of, but only if invitee has no
knowledge of the condition). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (1978) further states
that an invitee can assume the risk of abnormally dangerous activities, but only if the invitee is
aware of the danger. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the duty to warn is an at-
tempt to mitigate the effects of informational asymmetry.
185. This follows Eisenberg's model. See supra text accompanying note 184.
186. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 184, at 48. This form of uncertainty is referred to in
the economics literature as "secondary" or "market" uncertainty and is defined as a situation
in which information about certain future or present events is known to some, but not to all
economic actors. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 184, at 55.
187. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 184, at 48.
188. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 184, at 235. Thus, these cases depart from the per-
fect contractual environment in two ways: I) inability of the employee to have full information
about the nature and consequences of his choice; and 2) insufficient number of buyers of em-
ployee labor to ensure that the employee's choice of terms and conditions is voluntary.
189. COOTER & ULEN. supra note 184, at 48. These facts, in the most egregious em-
ployment cases, could be classified as "destructive facts." These are facts, that if not disclosed,
will cause harm to another. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 184, at 264, 265. This may be an
appropriate view, for example, when the employer already knows that the employee's position
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such facts creates inefficient use of resources, as employees are
forced to make defensive expenditures to ascertain the facts the em-
ployer already knows, or to take action to protect themselves from
the potential harms caused by their relative ignorance.19 An em-
ployee unsure of the duration of his new position may delay a home
purchase in the new city, paying non-deductible rent. The employee's
spouse may retain her job in the old city, causing dislocations in the
family. The alternatives are to risk a move in ignorance, or to use
resources to overcome the informational asymmetry. These various
inefficient choices can be avoided by a rule of law precluding the
employer from taking advantage of her superior position.
The application of the doctrine of unconscionability in the em-
ployment context would serve to redress some of the inequity and
inefficiency caused by the informational asymmetry that exists be-
tween employers and employees. If employers knew that they would
be liable for failing to disclose information to a prospective employee
about future plans for plant closings or other downsizing, they might
be more forthcoming with the information available to them. The
resulting employment contracts would be more efficient and fair,
though not as advantageous to the employer, who may not be able to
lure the unsuspecting employee to the new job only to eliminate that
job within a short time.
Of course, the informational asymmetry could be skewed in the
other direction. It could be the employee who somehow agrees to
accept the new position with ulterior motives, intending to leave the
job within a short period of time. 191 There is no reason why such an
employee should not also be liable under a theory of
unconscionability.
For most cases of unconscionability, the appropriate remedy is
to avoid the contract, or at least its oppressive terms. In this particu-
lar employment context, however, the appropriate remedy is to en-
force an implied contract for a reasonable time. Though this may be
a departure from traditional unconscionability doctrine, there are no
reasons why a court should feel limited to remedies developed in one
context that clearly are unsatisfactory in another.
is scheduled for elimination before the job offer is made.
190. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 184, at 259.
191. The employee may accept the job and then only receive moving expenses paid to
another city because a spouse has been offered employment there. The employee may want
only the training that the job would offer, at the employer's expense, intending to leave as soon
as training is completed.
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IV. Conclusion
A fair reading of the most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
cases on the subject of employment192 indicates that the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is alive and well. 19 3 Most of the inroads made
toward modifying that doctrine and mitigating its severe effect on
employees have been in the area of tort law. When the termination
of employment is found to violate public policy or if it has been mo-
tivated by malice, the courts have been willing to consider diverging
from the strict application of employment-at-will. 9
These doctrines, however, afford no relief to the employee who
is terminated soon after taking on a new job or a transfer to a new
city. Such terminations are often motivated by business judgment,
rather than malice, and more often than not fall outside recognized
public policy doctrines.' 9 Nevertheless, the effect of the termination
on the new employee, who must relocate and give up his current and
potential situations, is often more devastating than, it would be on an
employee of long standing.
It is inadequate to ask the employee contemplating such a move
to bargain for a better contract. Some may be in a position to do so,
but most are not. If the doctrines of consideration, promissory estop-
pel, and unconscionability were applied to employment relations as
recommended above, the employer would still be free to bargain spe-
cifically for the power to terminate the employee at-will, if such a
power were desired. However, by putting the burden on the employer
to do so, the employee would gain at least the advantage of notice
that this right was being reserved and might be able to exact some
promise or other consideration in exchange for it, such as payment of
moving expenses.
When a particular employee relates a "horror story" of how she
was encouraged to accept a new job, told of all the many advantages
and opportunities it would offer, and then unceremoniously fired
shortly thereafter without cause, it is easy to understand the eco-
nomic and psychic harm she has suffered and to empathize. Is it
"fair" to allow an employer to act in such a way in its contractual
192. Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990); Clay v. Advanced Computer
Application, Inc., 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989).
193. However, the refusal of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review Scullion v.
Emeco Industries, Inc., 580 A.2d 1356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allocatur denied, 592 A.2d 45
(Pa. 1991), casts some doubt on the Supreme Court's intention :o adhere strictly to that
doctrine.
194. However, even these doctrines are under attack. See supra text accompanying note
9.
195. See supra text accompanying note I1.
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relations? Is it economically efficient to allow human resources to be
committed so irresponsibly? Is freedom of contract so absolute that
it cannot be modified to protect the parties to the contract, not from
a deal that happens to work out badly, but from being taken advan-
tage of?
All of these questions should be answered in the negative. Ex-
isting contractual doctrine can be applied to the sale of labor, just as
it is to the sale of goods and services. By treating the employee as we
treat the consumer or the business person, we achieve more just and
efficient employment relations. Freedom to contract is no more vio-
lated in this context than it is in any other sphere of commerce
where doctrines exist to protect the parties to a contract from their
ignorance and lack of bargaining power, and from the sharp prac-
tices and advantage-taking of those with whom they must deal.
It is, therefore, time for the courts to remember their existing
doctrines of consideration, promissory estoppel, and unconscionabil-
ity, and apply them, when appropriate, to the relations of employers
and employees. Scullion196 is the archetype of the case in which all
of these doctrines arguably apply. Perhaps it is a harbinger of things
to come.
196. Scullion, 580 A.2d 1356.

